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Executive Summary
Computerised systems appear in
almost all aspects of our daily lives,
often in safety-critical scenarios
such as embedded control systems
in cars and aircraft or medical
devices such as pacemakers and
sensors. We are thus increasingly
reliant on these systems working
correctly, despite often operating in
unpredictable or unreliable
environments. Designers of such
devices need ways to guarantee
that they will operate in a reliable
and efficient manner.
Quantitative verification is a
technique for analysing quantitative
aspects of a system’s design, such
as timeliness, reliability or
performance. It applies formal
methods, based on a rigorous
analysis of a mathematical model
of the system, to automatically
prove certain precisely specified
properties, e.g. “the airbag will
always deploy within 20
milliseconds after a crash” or “the
probability of both sensors failing
simultaneously is less than 0.001”.
The ability to formally guarantee
quantitative properties of this kind
is beneficial across a wide range of
application domains. For example,
in safety-critical systems, it may be
essential to establish credible
bounds on the probability with
which certain failures or
combinations of failures can occur.
In embedded control systems, it is
often important to comply with strict
constraints on timing or resources.
More generally, being able to derive
guarantees on precisely specified
levels of performance or efficiency
is a valuable tool in the design of,
for example, wireless networking
protocols, robotic systems or power
management algorithms, to name
but a few.
This report gives a short
introduction to quantitative
verification, focusing in particular
on a widely used technique called
model checking, and its
generalisation to the analysis of
quantitative aspects of a system
such as timing, probabilistic
behaviour or resource usage.
The intended audience is industrial
designers and developers of
systems such as those highlighted
above who could benefit from the
application of quantitative
verification, but lack expertise in
formal verification or modelling.
This report, in addition to explaining
the basics of quantitative
verification, highlights a variety of
successful practical applications of
these methods and provides
suggestions as to how interested
readers can learn more about
these techniques, and engage with
the researchers that are developing
them. We hope that this will spur
further advances in this rapidly
advancing area and its applicability
to industrial-scale problems.
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Quantitative Verification: An Introduction
Formal verification
Formal verification is an approach
for checking the correctness of a
computerised system during its
design phase. In contrast to
testing, which checks that the
system behaves correctly under a
finite number of test cases, formal
verification is designed to be
exhaustive: it uses mathematical
reasoning to guarantee the
absence of errors. Conversely,
when system errors do exist, formal
verification can also serve as an
effective bug-hunting technique.
Formal verification has become an
essential part of the design phase
in several industries. For example,
in the development of integrated
circuits, verification functionality in
electronic design automation (EDA)
tools is routinely used to eradicate
errors that would be hugely
expensive to fix later in the design
process. In safety-critical domains
such as the avionics industry,
stringent regulations for
certification have led to widespread
usage of formal verification
techniques to prove correctness of
systems components.
Model checking [27] is a commonly
used formal verification technique,
which has been applied with great
success to check the correctness of
(and identify errors in), for example,
hardware device drivers and both
cryptographic and communication
protocols. First, the correct
behaviour of these systems is
formally specified and then a
mathematical model that captures
all possible executions of the
system is systematically
constructed and analysed in order
to verify that the correctness
properties are satisfied. In some
cases, these are abstract models,
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Figure 1: Quantitative verification, used for performance analysis of the
root contention phase of the Firewire protocol [72].
designed by hand and based on
expert knowledge of the system; in
others, they can be extracted
directly, from source code or a
high-level design document. A key
appeal of model checking is that,
once the model and its correctness
properties have been specified, the
verification process itself is typically
fully automated.
Quantitative aspects
of correctness
Computerised systems play a
critical role in almost all aspects of
our daily lives, from embedded
control systems in cars and aircraft,
to medical devices such as
pacemakers and sensors, to the
multitude of electronic devices that
make up our communication
networks. Often, these systems
function in unpredictable or
unreliable environments, yet we
have become reliant on them
working reliably and efficiently.
This means that quantitative (or
“nonfunctional”) aspects of
correctness have become
increasingly important. Whether we
are concerned with guarantees
about the operation of a
safety-critical system, or an
analysis of the performance of a
communication protocol (see, for
example, Figure 1), verifying that
systems function ‘correctly’ may
require the ability to reason about:
• Time: Does the airbag
successfully deploy within 20
milliseconds upon detection of a
crash?
• Probabilities: Is the probability
of successful message
transmission greater than 0.99?
• Resources: Does the robot
complete its mission without
depleting its battery?
Quantitative verification generalises
formal verification: it comprises a
variety of techniques that can be
used to produce formal guarantees
about quantitative aspects of
system behaviour, such as
reliability, performance or
timeliness. In this report, we give
an overview of these techniques,
with a particular emphasis on timed
and probabilistic variants of model
checking.
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Model checking for
real-time and
probabilistic systems
Model-checking techniques,
originally designed to prove or
disprove the absence of errors in a
system, have now been extended
to reason in a more quantitative
fashion about correctness.
The basic approach (see Figure 2
for an overview) remains to
construct a model of a system’s
behaviour, but now incorporating
information about the timing or
likelihood of events that may occur.
Typically, from the user’s point of
view, this is done using a high-level
modelling language, often one that
is specific to the model-checking
software being used. From this, the
software exhaustively constructs
and analyses the underlying
low-level model, i.e. it explores all
the possible configurations (states)
that the system can be in and the
ways in which it can evolve
between these states (transitions).
Real-time systems. When precise
constraints on the timing of events
are needed, timed automata are a
popular high-level model. These
allow the modeller to specify the
delays that occur as transitions
take place between states.
Examples of their use include
modelling real-time control systems
for manufacturing processes or
automotive applications.
Probabilistic systems. Another
key ingredient when modelling and
verifying quantitative aspects of a
system’s behaviour is probability.
This can be used to model many
sources of uncertainty, for example
the potential failure of a physical
component, the time delay
associated with transmitting data
across a busy wireless channel, or
the presence of noise from
unreliable sensors in an embedded
system. Some systems also
High-level 
model/design 
Specification 
(temporal logic) 
Verification 
results 
System 
Diagnostics 
System 
 require- 
ments 
¬E? fail 
Model  
checker 
module A 
    a : [0..N] init N; 
    ab : [0..N] init 0; 
    [r1] a>0 → k1*a : 
(a?=a-1)&(ab?=ab+1); 
    [r2] ab>0 → k2*ab : (a’=a
+1)&(ab’=ab-1); 
    [r3] a>0 → k3*a : (a’=a-1); 
Low-level model 
(states, transitions) 
Model checking 
? 
Numerical 
results 
Figure 2: An overview of the model-checking framework.
explicitly incorporate probabilistic
behaviour through the use of
randomisation: e.g. random
back-off in wireless protocols and
probabilistic network routing for
efficiency or anonymity.
Many different models exist to
capture the probabilistic behaviour
of systems. Prominent examples
include (discrete-time or
continuous-time) Markov chains
and Markov decision processes.
Property specifications. For
verification, the required behaviour
of a system needs to be formally
specified. This is often done using
temporal logics (but more
user-friendly formats also exist -
see Box 7). Examples include
TCTL (Timed Computation Tree
Logic) for real-time systems and
PCTL (Probabilistic Computation
Tree Logic) or CSL (Continuous
Stochastic Logic) for probabilistic
systems. An example of a PCTL
specification and its meaning is:
• detect ⇒ P≥0.999[^
≤20 deploy]:
“With probability at least 0.999,
the airbag successfully deploys
within 20 milliseconds upon
detection of a crash.”
Verifying that models satisfy such
properties is achieved using
model-checking software. The most
widely used examples for real-time
and probabilistic systems are
UPPAAL and PRISM, respectively.
Box 1: History of
Key Developments
Late 80s: Basic theory of
probabilistic model checking,
e.g. [108].
1990: Timed automata formal-
ism, for modelling real-time sys-
tems, proposed by Alur &Dill [7].
Mid 90s: Probabilistic logic
PCTL and model-checking algo-
rithms proposed [52, 16].
Mid 90s: Zone-based data struc-
tures developed to allow efficient
analysis of timed automata [77].
1995: First release of the UP-
PAAL model checker, for mod-
elling and verification of timed
automata.
2000: First versions of the prob-
abilistic model checkers PRISM
and ETMCC (now MRMC).
Early 2000s: Probabilistic model
checking extended to continuous-
time Markov chains, for perfor-
mance and reliability [8, 9].
2000s: New variants of UPPAAL
for cost-based models, synthesis-
ing controllers and efficient, com-
positional verification.
2011: PRISM 4.0 adds support
for systems with both probabilis-
tic and real-time behaviour [69].
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What Can Be Done with Quantitative Verification?
Quantitative verification techniques
have been successfully deployed in
a variety of application domains,
both to prove correctness and to
find bugs or anomalies. We identify
three key areas of application:
• safety-critical systems;
• performance/reliability;
• scheduling/optimisation,
and illustrate each area with a
number of success stories,
concentrating on those with
industrial connections.
Safety-critical systems
Safety-critical systems are those
where failure is deemed to be
unacceptable, for example because
it could lead to loss of life or major
environmental damage. Examples
can be found in domains such as
avionics, nuclear energy, process
control, robotics, transport and
medicine.
In many cases, strict constraints
are imposed upon the correctness
or reliability of computerised
systems in these domains, for
example by industrial regulations or
certification procedures.
Quantitative verification can be
used to generate formal guarantees
about such aspects of the design of
a safety-critical system.
Automotive systems. Box 2
describes an example of using
probabilistic verification to formally
assess reliability in the context of a
safety-critical system from the
automotive domain.
Box 2: Failure Analysis for an Airbag System
Automotive systems are required to operate under strict safety constraints. Researchers at the Univer-
sity of Konstanz and Swinburne University, in conjunction with industrial partners TRW Automotive GmbH,
used probabilistic model checking as part of a failure analysis for a car airbag system, as reported in [4].
Their approach was based on the FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) process
[1], one of the first systematic approaches for failure analysis developed by reliabil-
ity engineers. FMEA analyses potential failures of system components, assessing
and ranking the risks associated with them, and then identifying and addressing the
most serious problems. The FMEA process can be time-intensive and the analysis
is sometimes informal. Quantitative verification was applied in order to overcome
these limitations. The analysis was based on the probabilistic FMEA process of
Grunske et. al. [50], which combines FMEA with probabilistic model checking and
the generation of probabilistic counterexamples [5].
The airbag system consists of three major component types: sensors, crash evalua-
tors and actuators. The sensors are used to detect accidents such as impacts or the
car rolling, and the information from the sensors is then processed by two indepen-
dent crash evaluators. If both evaluators agree that a crash has occurred, then the
actuators respond by deploying the airbags. The use of a second crash evaluator is a recent addition to airbag systems,
aimed at avoiding unnecessary deployment, which is seen as the most dangerous malfunction that can occur. The
failure analysis considered variants of the airbag system with both one and two crash evaluators.
The probabilistic model checker PRISM was used to construct models of the two different variants of the system,
with their behaviour being modelled using a continuous-time Markov chain. Probabilistic FMEA analysis was then
performed on the models. The requirements for the system were developed based on a draft of the ISO standard 26262
for road vehicles, which states that the airbag system must comply with ASIL D (Automated Safety Integration Level
D) for unintended deployment. The requirements were formalised using the temporal logic CSL and then verified
against the models using PRISM. The analysis found that certain ASIL D requirements were violated in the one-
processor variant of the system. Furthermore, using counterexample generation and visualisation, the critical aspect
of this violation was identified as the failure of the micro-processor.
An evaluation of the work carried out concluded that PRISM’s modelling language could be learned quickly by the
engineers on the project to specify models. However the same could not be said for property specification using the
CSL logic. To resolve this, property specification patterns [49] (see Box 7) were used. Other limiting factors were the
size of the system models that needed to be constructed and the time required to verify some of the CSL properties.
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Real-time communication.
Another example is the use of the
real-time systems model-checking
tool UPPAAL to model and verify
the commercial real-time
communications protocol AF100
(Advant Field-bus 100) [28],
developed and implemented by
ABB for safety-critical applications.
This case study is one of the
largest to which UPPAAL has been
applied and the verification had to
be applied to a sequence of
models, representing different
levels of abstraction.
The conclusion of this work was
that, although it is possible to
implement the communications
protocol such that its specified
requirements are satisfied, care
must be taken to avoid certain race
conditions (e.g. situations where
more than process tries to access a
resource at the same time) and
delays. The analysis also
demonstrated several imperfections
in the protocol’s logic and
implementation. The sources of
these errors were then debugged
using abstract models of the
protocol and solutions to these
problems were given.
Performance and
reliability
Our second highlighted area for the
application of quantitative
verification techniques is the formal
analysis of performance and
reliability properties. Temporal
logics such as PCTL, and in
particular CSL, have proved to be
an effective way of formally
capturing a wide range of useful
properties, and probabilistic
verification has been used for their
analysis in a variety of domains.
Process control. Box 3 gives an
illustration of this kind of analysis: a
reliability analysis of an industrial
process control system, which
includes application of the
probabilistic model checker PRISM.
Box 3: Reliability of an Industrial Process Control System
Engineers from ABB Corporate Research, working with the EU-funded research project Q-ImPrESS, ap-
plied probabilistic verification to study the reliability of a large-scale process control system used in a
variety of industrial settings, including power generation, chemical processes and material handling [67].
Central 
control 
unit 
Input 
modules 
Sensors Actuators 
Output 
modules 
Visualisation and interaction 
The control system is used to access the sensors and actuators of an
industrial process. It provides a graphical visualisation of important
values from the sensors and allows interaction with the actuators (e.g.
opening or closing valves). In total, the control system comprises over
3 million lines of code and 100 components, structured into 9 sub-
systems.
The study applied an architecture-based software reliability analysis
(ABSRA) approach [47, 48], the main objective of which is to obtain
an estimate of the overall reliability of a software application through
the reliability of both the application’s individual components and its architecture. These methods are also used to
identify the most critical components of the application and quantify their influence on the overall reliability.
The reliability of individual components was estimated using failure reports from ABB customers and the Littlewood-
Verrall software reliability growth model [82]. The overall system was modelled as a discrete-time Markov chain
and sensitivity analysis was performed using the probabilistic model checker PRISM. The sensitivity analysis corre-
sponded to finding the influence of the failure rates of individual components on the overall failure rate of the system,
and hence how critical each component is to the overall reliability of the system.
One important motivation for this case study was to provide an empirical evaluation of the ABSRA approach on a
larger scale industrial software system than had previously been considered, and to assess the benefits and costs of
using these methods. It was found that the main effort was in data collection and processing, and that performing
accurate modelling was an expensive process. In addition, there was a trade-off in terms of the level of abstraction
at which the system was modelled: a high level of abstraction ensures that verification is tractable, but this comes at
the cost of the usefulness of the results of the analysis. Further case studies and details of a more general framework
for model-driven reliability analysis of component-based systems are presented in [26], including a discussion of
“feedback provisioning”, which analyses the results of quantitative verification in order to try to improve reliability.
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Cloud computing. Researchers at
Fujitsu used probabilistic model
checking to analyse the
performance of resource
management operations in cloud
computing [65]. Based on
performance data collected from an
experimental virtualised system, a
continuous-time Markov chain
model of the system was built, and
performance properties were
expressed in CSL. The probabilistic
model checker PRISM was used for
the analysis. The results showed
that quantitative verification gave
cloud computing service
administrators a way to analyse the
management operations, and
hence help in providing efficient
and reliable services.
Satellite platforms. The
COMPASS project, working with
the European Space Agency (ESA)
developed a tool chain to analyse a
modern satellite platform [38],
including the probabilistic model
checker MRMC. This study
considered a variety of different
behavioural characteristics,
including discrete, real-time, hybrid
and stochastic features, and used a
range of quantitative (and
nonquantitative) verification
methods to analyse performance,
reliability, correctness and safety.
Scheduling and
optimisation
A further use of quantitative
verification techniques is to solve
scheduling or optimisation
problems. Rather than analysing
the timeliness or performance of an
existing, fully specified system,
verification methods and tools are
used for the reverse problem of
finding a system configuration that
satisfies (or optimises) a particular
performance criterion.
Scheduling or resource allocation
problems occur in many different
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Figure 3: Structure of an example task scheduling problem.
application domains, including
transport, manufacturing,
telecommunications networks and
parallel computing.
In general, a scheduling problem
involves finding a way to assign a
set of tasks to a set of resources,
typically under certain constraints
on the ordering in which tasks can
be performed and the number of
tasks that can be assigned to
resources simultaneously (see
Figure 3 for an example problem).
The goal is to execute all tasks,
while either satisfying a given
constraint on time or resource
usage, or in a way that minimises
execution time or resource usage.
Closely related is the dual problem
of finding the worst case execution
time (WCET), i.e. the maximum
time taken to complete all tasks,
given some additional constraints
on how the tasks are scheduled.
Finding solutions to these problems
is often addressed in fields such as
operational research, artificial
intelligence and queueing theory,
using techniques that include
constraint programming, genetic
algorithms and mixed integer linear
programming. However,
quantitative verification methods, in
particular using (priced) timed
automata, have been shown to
provide a competitive
alternative [2, 14].
Box 4 outlines an industrial case
study using quantitative verification
to perform schedulability analysis
on a satellite system.
Additional case studies using this
approach are discussed below.
Real-time Java. In [17] the authors
use the SARTS tool to perform
schedulability analysis on hard
real-time Java programs. SARTS
automatic translates these
programs to timed automata
models (written in the input
language for UPPAAL). A WCET
analysis of a Java program is then
performed by analysing the
corresponding timed automaton.
The approach is fully automated,
so there is no need for the user to
understand the underlying
model-checking process.
This case study demonstrated that
quantitative verification is
comparable with alternative
approaches for performing WCET
analysis and in fact can yield more
accurate results than the traditional
techniques. However, the
improvement in accuracy does
come at a cost, both in terms of the
time required for the analysis and
its scalability. To combat the latter,
compositional approaches have
since been developed to analyse
safety-critical Java programs [18].
Hydraulic pump controllers. An
industrial case study concerning a
controller for a hydraulic oil pump
provided by the HYDAC company
can be found in [24]. The controller
aims both to keep oil and gas
pressure levels within safe intervals
and to minimise the energy
accumulated in the system.
Controllers were synthesised using
UPPAAL, verified using the tool
PHAVer and simulated
with Simulink [101]. They were
shown to outperform the controllers
designed by HYDAC, while also
being robust and provably correct.
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Power Management. Dynamic
power management is the use of
runtime strategies to achieve a
tradeoff between the performance
and power consumption of a
system and its components. In [89],
a framework to synthesise and
analyse dynamic power
management strategies using
probabilistic model checking is
presented. Figure 4 illustrates the
optimal expected power
consumption given varying
constraints on the average request
queue size and expected number
of lost requests for an IBM
TravelStar VP disk-drive. We see
that tightening the performance
constraints (requiring the average
queue size to be smaller or that
fewer requests are lost) leads to a
“less optimal” controller (since the
power consumption increases).
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Figure 4: An analysis of optimal power management policies for an IBM
TravelStar VP disk-drive using probabilistic model checking [89].
Box 4: The Herschel-Planck Satellite System
A good example of the applicability of quantitative verification to scheduling problems is the use of the timed model
checker UPPAAL to analyse schedulability in the Herschel-Planck satellite system [85]. Each satellite comprises a sin-
gle processor, which runs a real-time operating system and has a selection of software tasks to execute with deadlines.
The goal was to investigate whether these tasks could be scheduled on the single
processor without violating any of the deadlines. To achieve this, an earlier formula-
tion of this scheduling problem [92] was encoded as a timed automaton. The model
captures the behaviour of the processor’s scheduler, the software tasks that need to
be executed, and various resource usage measures and deadlines. Required prop-
erties of the schedule, including worst-case blocking and response times, processor
utilisation and deadline satisfaction, are modelled within the timed automaton model
and UPPAAL then is used to analyse the model and produce a schedule that satisfies
the constraints. The resulting schedule can be visualised graphically as a Gantt chart
using UPPAAL’s simulator.
An interesting conclusion of the work was that the quantitative verification approach with timed automata yielded
less pessimistic response time estimates than classical techniques, such as those in [92]. This meant that it was able
to produce a task schedule that satisfied all the required constraints in cases where alternative scheduling techniques
could not find such a solution. In particular, one conclusion of [92] was that a particular software task on the satellite
could potentially violate its deadline requirements, although this behaviour had never been seen in practice. The
analysis in [85] demonstrated that the deadline requirements were actually met.
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Other applications
Security. Quantitative behaviour is
an important aspect of modelling
and analysing security protocols.
For example, time delays between
communications may unwittingly
leak hidden information or an
attacker may be able to guess a
password with some probability.
One example of applying
quantitative verification to the
security domain is [104], which
studies the PIN blocks used to
encrypt and transmit customers’
PINs in banking networks. The
probabilistic model checker PRISM
was used to detect the most
effective ways to construct PIN
block attacks, consisting of
sequences of API commands that
enable an attacker to determine the
value of a PIN from an encrypted
PIN block.
Other applications of quantitative
verification to the security domain
include anonymity networks [100],
access control mechanisms [88],
denial of service threats [12],
information flow [45], quantum
cryptography [41] and contract
signing [90].
Communication, network and
multimedia protocols. Again, in
this setting, quantitative aspects of
system behaviour play an important
role. For example, randomisation is
often used to break symmetry
between devices communicating
with the same protocol, and
real-time constraints frequently
appear in protocols or the mediums
under which they are designed to
operate. Quantitative verification
case studies in this area include
routing protocols [40], network
configuration [46, 70], Bluetooth
device discovery [36] and collision
avoidance schemes [62, 71].
Further examples of applications
of quantitative verification include
gearbox controllers [81], web
services [97], cardiac pacemakers
[25], robotics [75] and systems
biology [53].
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Quantitative Verification: In Depth
Model checking for
real-time systems
Automated formal verification of
systems whose behaviour depends
on real-time constraints is often
performed using a modelling
formalism called timed automata,
first proposed by Alur and Dill in the
early 90s [7].
A timed automaton is a state
transition system augmented with
real-valued clocks. States (which
are referred to as locations)
represent different possible
configurations of the system being
modelled. Transitions between
these locations, representing the
ways that the system can evolve,
are annotated with guards, which
constrain when the transitions can
be taken, based on the current
values of the clocks. Locations are
also labelled with invariants,
indicating how long can be spent in
a particular location before a
transition must be taken.
Box 5 illustrates the use of timed
automata to model a real-time
system: a train controller. This
example also demonstrates
another prominent feature of the
formalism: models are typically
constructed as networks of timed
automata, representing different
components of the system. The
automata can communicate with
each other by sending data through
channels.
To verify that a system modelled
using timed automata behaves
correctly, we perform model
checking. First, the required
properties of the system are
specified formally, typically using
temporal logic. A simple example of
a property is “it is impossible to
reach the location Error”, which
can be expressed in the temporal
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System 
Counter- 
example or 
Optimal 
schedule 
System 
 require- 
ments 
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Figure 5: An overview of model checking for real-time systems.
logic CTL (Computation Tree Logic)
as A[(¬Error)]. A wider range of
quantitative properties can be
expressed using the logic TCTL [6],
e.g. A[(Send ⇒ A[^≤200 Ack])] –
“whenever location Send is visited,
we are guaranteed to reach
location Ack within 200
milliseconds”. In this report, we
omit precise details of the notation
for these logics, instead just giving
simple illustrative examples. See
the pointers given in the “Next
Steps” section for information.
Properties such as these can be
verified on a timed automaton,
through a systematic exploration of
the possible executions of the
model. In order to scale this
approach up to models of realistic
size, symbolic techniques were
developed, which efficiently
represent the possible values that
clocks can take using zones.
Thanks to these methods and to
mature software support in the form
of tools like UPPAAL [78] and
KRONOS [20], timed automata are
widely used and have been
successfully applied to verify, for
example, real-time controllers and
real-time communication protocols.
Timed automata can also be
extended in various ways. For
example, weights or prices can be
added and used to reason about
resource usage or energy
consumption; and timed game
variants of the model can be used
to model uncontrollable or
adversarial aspects of a system’s
environment. Separate branches of
UPPAAL (UPPAAL CORA and
UPPAAL TIGA, respectively) have
been developed to verify these
models.
These extended models have
proved to be particularly successful
for scheduling and controller
synthesis problems. Here, rather
than verifying the correct behaviour
of an existing system, timed
automata are used to construct
optimal or provably correct
solutions to problems such as
scheduling a set of tasks against a
set of real-time constraints, or
constructing real-time controllers
for embedded systems. See [19]
for an overview.
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Box 5: Timed Automata - An Example
Figures 6 and 7 show timed automata used to model and verify a train controller which coordinates the safe passage
of two trains across a single section of track running over a bridge.
x=0
x=0
x=0
Approach
x=0
Restart
Crossing
x<=15
x>=15
x>=5
x>=10
x<= 15
stop[id]?
x<=25 x<=10
Waiting
restart[id]?
approach[id]!
Distant
clear[id]!
Figure 6: Train automaton.
Figure 6 refers to a single train. We model two trains, using two
copies of this automaton, with the id parameter set to either 0 or
1. The initial location, indicated by a double circle, is Distant, rep-
resenting the situation where the train is far away from the bridge.
When the train nears, the automaton moves to the Approach loca-
tion, notifying the controller of this using channel approach[id].
Sending and receiving on a channel are denoted by the symbols !
and ?, respectively. The timed automaton also has a local clock,
x, which is reset to 0 at this point. While approaching, if no more
than 15 time units have elapsed (i.e. the train is not too close to the
bridge to stop), the train can be stopped by the controller, via chan-
nel stop[id], resulting in a transition to location Waiting. Otherwise,
the train will cross the bridge after between 15 and 25 time units,
moving to the location Crossing. Notice how the time constraints
are encoded: the transitions to Waiting and Crossing have guards x≤15 and x≥15, indicating when they can be taken.
The Approach location also has an invariant x≤25, meaning that it must be left before clock x exceeds 25 time units.
If the train has been stopped, it waits for communication on channel restart[id], and then starts crossing after between
10 and 15 time units. Crossing the bridge takes between 5 and 10 seconds, after which the train notifies the controller
(via channel clear[id]) and returns to the location Distant.
clear[1]?clear[0]?
restart[0]!
approach[1]?
clear[id]?
restart[1]!stop[1]!
approach[0]?
stop[0]!
approach[id]?
Stop1 Stop0
Approaching
Clear
id : id_t
Restart1 Wait0Restart0Wait1
id : id_t
Figure 7: Controller automaton.
The timed automaton for the controller is given
in Figure 7. It keeps track of whether the trains
are approaching, stopped or travelling over the
bridge. The controller starts in location Clear,
corresponding to the situation where the bridge
is clear and no trains are approaching.
If a single train approaches and crosses the
bridge before another train arrives, the con-
troller will receive a message over the chan-
nel approach[id] move to the location Approach,
then receive a message over clear[id] and return
to location Clear.
On the other hand, if two trains approach the
bridge at the same time (i.e. if two successive
messages along channels approach[id] are received, and none along a channel clear[id]), then the controller moves
to location Stop0 or Stop1 after which it immediately instructs one of the trains to stop (using the channel stop[id])
and moves to Wait0 or Wait1). This immediacy is encoded in the automaton by making Stop0 and Stop1 committed
locations (labelled by a “c”), implying that the location must be left immediately, without further time elapsing. When
the bridge again becomes clear (i.e. the controller receives a message on the channel clear[id]), the controller moves
to the location Restart0 or Restart1, instructs the stopped train to restart through the channel restart[id] and moves
back to Approaching.
Example correctness properties for the model described here, written in TCTL, include:
• A[¬(Train(0).Crossing ∧ Train(1).Crossing)] – “At most one train at a time will be crossing the bridge”
• A[(Train(0).Approach ⇒ A[^Train(0).Crossing])] – “Whenever train 0 approaches, it eventually crosses”
• A[(Train(0).Waiting ⇒ A[^≤30Train(0).Restart])] – “Train 0 is only ever stopped for at most 30 time units”
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Probabilistic
model checking
Probabilistic model checking
(sometimes known as stochastic
model checking) is a generalisation
of model checking for verifying
quantitative properties of systems
which exhibit stochastic behaviour,
for example due to failures or
uncertainty about the environment.
Like other forms of model checking,
it is based on the rigorous
construction and analysis of a
system model (see Figure 8). In
this case the models are
probabilistic, i.e. they capture the
likelihood that each possible
execution of the system occurs.
The simplest type of model is a
discrete-time Markov chain
(DTMC), which can be thought of
as a state transition system where
the transitions between states are
labelled with the probability that
they are taken. Box 6 illustrates the
use of a DTMC to model an
embedded system whose
components can fail.
Another popular type of model is a
continuous-time Markov chain
(CTMC), which captures not just
the probability of making transitions
between states, but also of the
delays incurred before making
transitions. These random delays
are represented using exponential
probability distributions, making
CTMCs well suited to the modelling
and analysis of, for example,
performance and reliability of
computer systems.
A third common model is a Markov
decision process (MDP), as used in
fields such as control theory and
robotics. MDPs allows us to model
the effect on our system of a
separate entity such as a controller,
e.g. for a robotic system.
High-level 
model/design 
Specification 
(temporal logic) 
System 
System 
 require- 
ments 
P<0.1 [? fail ] 
Model checker  
e.g. PRISM 
Low-level model 
(states, transitions) 
Probabilistic model checking 
? 
Verification 
results 
0.5 
0.1 
0.4 
module A 
    a : [0..N] init N; 
    ab : [0..N] init 0; 
    [r1] a>0 → k1*a : 
(a?=a-1)&(ab?=ab+1); 
    [r2] ab>0 → k2*ab : (a’=a
+1)&(ab’=ab-1); 
    [r3] a>0 → k3*a : (a’=a-1); 
Numerical 
results 
Figure 8: An overview of probabilistic model checking.
We can formalise the required
properties of these models using
probabilistic temporal logics.
Typically, these properties capture
not just “correctness”, but a variety
of quantitative characteristics of the
system, such as reliability or
performance. Examples, using the
probabilistic temporal logic
PCTL [52], include:
• P<0.01 [^(Fail1 ∧ Fail2) ]
“The probability of both sensors
eventually failing simultaneously
is less than 0.01”
• Sent ⇒ P≥0.95 [^
≤10 Arrive ]
“Every packet that is sent
arrives within 10ms with
probability at least 0.95”
In practice, it is also common to
use numerical variants of such
properties which, for example,
query the actual probability of an
event occurring, rather than
checking that its above or below a
specified threshold:
• P=? [^(Fail1 ∧ Fail2) ]
“What is the probability of both
sensors eventually failing
simultaneously?”
Probabilistic model checking is
used to evaluate the result of
queries such as those above,
based on an analysis of a
probabilistic model of system
behaviour. Crucially, this analysis is
performed in a rigorous fashion:
models are explored exhaustively
to check for all possible executions
and then queries are solved
through numerical solution
methods, for example by solving
systems of linear equations or
linear optimisation problems.
This is in contrast to simulation
techniques, which can produce
approximate answers, computed by
averaging over a large sample of
simulated system executions.
A trade-off between these
techniques can be achieved using
statistical model checking [79],
which performs statistical methods
on simulations to provide
approximate results to formally
specified verification queries.
Prominent software tools for
probabilistic model checking
include PRISM [69] and
MRMC [64]. These have been used
to verify quantitative properties of a
wide variety of real-life systems,
from wireless communication
protocols [36], to aerospace
designs [21], to DNA circuits [76].
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Box 6: Markov chains - An Example
Discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs) can be used to model a wide range of systems with probabilistic behaviour.
Here, we illustrate their application to model an embedded system comprising a processor which reads and processes
data from two sensors.
At each clock cycle, a variety of failures can occur, whose probability we can estimate based on known or
measured failure rates. There is a chance of a single sensor failing, for which the probability is dependent
on the number of sensors currently operational. The processor uses these sensors in dual modular redundancy,
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Figure 9: DTMC model of an embedded system.
meaning that it can function effectively as
long as at least one of the two sensors is op-
erational. If both become unavailable, then
during the next clock cycle the processor
shuts the system down. The processor it-
self also has a probability of failure during
a clock cycle. This can be either a perma-
nent fault or a transient fault. In the lat-
ter case, the situation can be rectified au-
tomatically by the processor rebooting it-
self during the next clock cycle. Reboot-
ing also has a chance of failure and if this
happens, then the processor just repeatedly
tries during each clock cycle to reboot until
successful.
Figure 9 illustrates a DTMC model of the
embedded system. Each state is labelled
by the number of operational sensors (0, 1,
or 2) and the status of the processor: oper-
ational (up), transient fault (trans), perma-
nent fault (perm) or shutdown (shutdown).
Initially all components are working. The
probabilities that the processor suffers a
temporary or permanent fault during a clock cycle are pt and pp, respectively, and pup = 1 − (pt+pp) is the prob-
ability that neither occur. In addition, pr denotes the probability the processor successfully reboots and qi is the
probability that a sensor fails when i are currently operational. Notice that in the DTMC it is possible both for a sensor
to fail and for the processor to fail or repair, and since we suppose these happen independently, the probability of both
occurring is given by multiplying the probability of the individual events.
To specify properties of this model, we associate some states with labels (or atomic propositions, to use the terminol-
ogy of temporal logic). We attach fails to states where both sensors have failed and failp to those where the processor
has permanently failed. Example properties in the temporal logic PTCL include:
• P<0.01 [ ^ (fails ∧ failp) ] – “The probability that the processor and sensors eventually fail is less than 0.01”
• P=? [ ^ (fails ∧ failp) ] – “What is the probability that the processor and sensors eventually fail?”
• P=? [ ^
≤1000 fails ] – “What is the probability that both sensors fail within the first 1000 cycles?”
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Modelling and
property specification
languages
As mentioned earlier, model
checkers typically take as input a
high-level description of a system
or its design, from which they
explore and construct a low-level
model of the states and transitions
than can arise.
A variety of modelling languages
and formalisms exist for this
purpose. Often, they are specific to
a piece of software. For example,
Figure 10 shows a screenshot of
UPPAAL, whose user interface
includes a graphical editor for
designing networks of timed
automata. A separate textual
description attached to these
automata describes additional
variables used in the model, and
can incorporate fragments of C
code to specify how they are
updated.
Figure 11 gives an example of the
modelling language used by the
PRISM tool. This is a textual
language, used to describe a
variety of different types of
probabilistic models.
Other tools and tool chains
sometimes use adaptations or
extensions of more mainstream
modelling languages. An example
is the QuantUM toolset [80], which
uses UML (Unified Modeling
Language) and SysML (Systems
Modeling Language), extended with
additional quantitative information
such as failure probabilities.
Figure 12 shows screenshots from
QuantUM. A similar approach,
mentioned earlier, is the COMPASS
toolset, which uses a customised
version of AADL (Architecture
Analysis & Design Language) [22].
Figure 10: A screenshot of the real-time model checker UPPAAL, showing
graphical editing of a collection of timed automata.
dtmc
const double q2; // probability of sensor failure (2 sensors operational)
const double q1; // probability of sensor failure (1 sensors operational)
const double pt; // probability of a transient failure of the processor
const double pp; // probability of a permanent failure of the processor
const double pup = 1 - (pt+pp); // process remains operational
const double pr; // probability processor repaired (transient fault)
// module for sensors behaviour
module sensors
s : [0..2] init 2; // operational sensors
// sensor can fail when system has not shut down
[cycle] s=2 & p>0 -> q2 : (s'=s-1) + 1-q2 : (s'=s);
[cycle] s=1 & p>0 -> q1 : (s'=s-1) + 1-q1 : (s'=s);
// loop when system has shut down
[cycle] s=0 & p>0 -> 1 : (s'=s);
endmodule
module processor
p : [0..3] init 3; // 0 - shutdown, 1 - perm, 2 - trans, 3 - up
// when up and some sensors operational can fail
[cycle] p=3 & s>0 -> pup : (p'=3) + pt : (p'=2) + pp : (p'=1);
// when up and no sensors operational go to shutdown
[cycle] p=3 & s=0 -> 1 : (p'=0);
// repair from transient fault
[cycle] p=2 -> pr : (p'=3) + (1-pr) : (p'=2);
// loop when system has shut down or permanent failure
[cycle] p<2 -> 1 : (p'=p);
endmodule
Figure 11: A description, in PRISM’s textual modelling language,
representing the Markov chain model from Box 6.
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Model checkers also require
specifications of the properties to
be checked of a model. Temporal
logics provide a precise and
unambiguous way of specifying a
wide range of properties: various
examples have been illustrated in
this document. However, to users
who are unfamiliar with such
formalisms, this approach to
property specification can be rather
unintuitive.
In practice, the majority of
properties needed can be
expressed using a relatively small
set of different classes of logical
formulae. A good solution is
therefore to use patterns:
commonly occurring classes of
formulae, typically identified by
studying a large set of system
properties extracted from
requirements documents and/or
verification case study reports.
Box 7 shows some examples.
Figure 12: Screenshots from the QuantUM toolset, showing its UML-based
modelling approach: the structure of an airbag model (top); and a
specification of failures for a system component (bottom).
Box 7: Quantitative Property Specifications using Patterns
The table below shows patterns for timed and probabilistic properties, as proposed by Konrad/Cheng [66] and
Grunske [49], respectively. The top two are timed and use the logic TCTL; the bottom four are probabilistic and
use the logic CSL. Colours indicate parameters to the patterns that are provided by the user.
Pattern name Example (temporal logic formula & meaning)
Bounded recurrence A[(A[^≤100 poll]] “The controller polls the server for messages
at least every 100 milliseconds.”
Bounded response A[(sense ⇒ A[^≤30 notif ])] “Whenever the sensor detects a movement, the
processor is notified within 30 milliseconds.”
Probabilistic invariance P≥0.999[
≤3600
¬fail] “With probability at least 0.999, no server fail-
ure will occur in the next hour.”
Probabilistic response P≥1[(send ⇒ P≥0.95[^
≤2 rec])] “Every time a message is sent, the probability
of it being successfully received within 2 sec-
ond is at least 0.95.”
Transient state probability P>0.99[^
=t both] “The probability of both sensors being opera-
tional at time t is greater than 0.99.”
Steady-state probability S≤0.05[¬min qos] “The long-run probability of a minimum ser-
vice level not being delivered is at most 0.05.”
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Current Challenges
Quantitative verification is an active
and growing research area. We
outline below a few of the key
challenges facing the area,
focusing on those in which
progress is likely to improve the
applicability of the techniques to
industrial-scale problems and thus
to a wider audience.
Scalability and efficiency are
always a challenge for verification,
particularly for techniques like
model checking which are based
on an exhaustive exploration of a
model. Often, the burden falls on
the user of a verification tool to
model a system at the right level of
abstraction such that its analysis is
feasible, but this can be difficult for
users new to the area.
Many fully-automated techniques
are being developed to improve
scalability and efficiency. Examples
include automatic generation of
model abstractions; compositional
methods (decomposing verification
tasks); parallel, distributed or
GPU-based approaches; and
simulation-based methods such as
statistical model checking.
Typically, these start out as
prototype software implementations
and then gradually make their way
into more established tools.
Mainstream languages. As
mentioned above, most current
quantitative verification tools
require the user to describe the
system to be verified in a
tool-specific modelling language.
Some tools have at least partial
support for more mainstream
languages, for example UPPAAL
timed automata models can
incorporate fragments of C code
and other tools support variants of
UML-based languages.
Generally, though, to make
quantitative verification accessible
to a wider audience, there is a need
to support more mainstream
programming and modelling
languages. As has been found in
the field of nonquantitative
verification, sophisticated
verification methods are needed to
cope with the complexity of
programs developed in more
expressive, mainstream languages.
Cyber-physical systems comprise
embedded sensing or control
systems that interact closely with
their physical environment.
Examples include smart grids,
medical monitoring devices and
autonomous automotive or avionic
systems. Clearly, in such
application domains, there is a
need for rigorous guarantees on
safety or performance levels, but
the complexity of such systems
makes applying quantitative
verification a major challenge.
Since system models need to
combine discrete aspects (for
computation devices) and
continuous aspects (for their
physical environment), hybrid
systems are an appropriate class
of models. Techniques and tools
are under development for various
subclasses of such models, but
much remains to be done.
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Next Steps
Get involved
We hope that this report has
provided a good illustration of the
potential benefits of applying
quantitative verification techniques,
and of the wide range of possible
application domains to which they
can be applied.
Many quantitative verification
software tools, along with guidance
for their usage and background
information about the techniques
that they use, are openly available.
We provide some pointers in the
sections below.
Of course, investigating the
applicability of these methods to
new problems or domains,
especially without background
knowledge of the area, can be
challenging. An excellent basis for
achieving this is through
collaboration with the researchers
who are actively working in the area
of quantitative verification and who
are in general very keen to tackle
industrially relevant problems.
Effective ways to go about
achieving such collaborations
include:
• acting as an industrial partner
on a research project;
• sponsoring, co-sponsoring or
co-supervising a PhD student;
• providing details and expertise
regarding an industrially
relevant case study.
We include, in Appendix 2, a list of
research groups actively working in
quantitative verification, along with
pointers to web sites with details of
the people involved and their
contact details.
Hands-on experience
The best way to understand what
can be done with quantitative
verification is to get some hands-on
experience with the tools and
techniques on offer. In Appendix 1,
we provide a list of relevant
software tools supporting the
techniques described in this report,
most of which are freely available.
Tutorials for these tools provide a
good way to learn about their
features and their modelling or
specification languages.
• The UPPAAL website [107] has
a “documentation” section with
pointers to several papers
(e.g. [13]) with detailed
descriptions of the software.
• The PRISM website [95] has a
series of online tutorials with
step-by-step instructions for
working with different features
of the tool and for analysing
various kinds of models.
For other tools, see the web links
given in Appendix 1.
Case studies also provide a good
practical introduction. Both the
UPPAAL and PRISM websites (see
above) include case study
repositories, which give an
indication of the application
domains to which the tools are
applicable and the problems that
can be solved. In some cases,
model files are provided, which can
then be experimented with in the
software, or used as a basis for a
related case study.
User support for many tools in this
area is provided by online forums
or mailing lists, populated by users
and tool developers/maintainers.
Further reading
The “In Depth” section of this report
provides some insight into the
underlying models and techniques
used in quantitative verification.
This helps users to understand, for
example, which kind of model is
most appropriate for a given
scenario, or which techniques/tools
may be most efficient for a given
problem. There is a wealth of
material available covering these
topics in greater detail.
Textbooks in the area mostly offer
broader coverage. A good starting
point is the book [11], which covers
the fundamentals for all aspects of
model checking, including chapters
on timed and probabilistic systems.
We also mention [99], which
provides a detailed tutorial for many
aspects of probabilistic model
checking, and [84], which gives an
introduction to different modelling
approaches, analysis techniques
and tools for real-time systems.
Tutorial papers, often freely
available on the web, are another
good source of in-depth learning
material. See [15] for an overview
of the semantic and algorithmic
aspects of verification tools for
timed automata. For probabilistic
model checking, [68] provides a
detailed introduction to the
modelling and verification of
(discrete- and continuous-time)
Markov chains, while [43] focuses
on model checking of Markov
decision processes, as well as a
number of more advanced topics,
and [91] covers models with both
probabilistic and real-time aspects.
We also recommend [19] and
[10, 63], which offer gentler
introductions to the areas of
verification for timed and
probabilistic systems.
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Conferences and
workshops
The techniques described in this
report are mostly still active
research topics. Conferences and
workshop venues in the area
provide an up-to-date view of the
latest developments. They are also
a good source of information about
successful or novel verification
case studies. Typically, they also
welcome industrial contributions
and participation.
Focused events, with a specific
emphasis on quantitative modelling
and verification, include:
• International Conference on
Quantitative Evaluation of
SysTems (QEST) [60];
• International Conference on
Formal Modeling and Analysis
of Timed Systems (FORMATS);
• International Conference on
Hybrid Systems: Computation
and Control (HSCC) [55].
In addition, the major international
conferences on formal methods
include sessions on quantitative
topics. Examples include:
• European Joint Conferences on
Theory and Practice of
Software (ETAPS) [39];
• International Conference on
Computer Aided Verification
(CAV) [59].
These events, and others, often
include more focused workshops
on quantitative verification, for
example, the International
Workshop on Quantitative Aspects
of Programming Languages and
Systems (QAPL).
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Appendix 1: Quantitative Verification Tools
We list below some of the most well-known software tools for quantitative verification, summarising what each offers
and what support and documentation are available. We restrict our attention to general-purpose tools, rather than
those that implement a specific verification technique. We also only list tools that are currently available (in most
cases, for free) and are still actively developed. We group the tools according to the types of models that they
support, since this is usually the key factor to consider when selecting the most appropriate tool.
Real-time Verification Software
UPPAAL [107] is an integrated tool environment for modelling, validation and verification of real-time systems
modelled as networks of timed automata. The tool is free for noncommercial applications in academia. The
website provides links to a discussion forum, a large range of case studies and small examples, manuals and
research papers. There are also links to extensions of UPPAAL including: TIMES, for schedulability analysis
and synthesis; CORA, for cost-optimal reachability analysis; TRON, for black-box conformance testing; and
TIGA, for solving timed game automata. Recently, support has been added for probabilistic aspects of timed
automata using statistical model-checking techniques.
Probabilistic Verification Software
PRISM [95] is a probabilistic model checker, which can be used to model, analyse and verify many types of
stochastic models, such as discrete-time and continuous-time Markov chains and Markov decision processes. It
recently added support for probabilistic real-time systems, modelled as probabilistic timed automata. PRISM is
free and open source, and has been used to analyse systems from many different application domains,
including communication and multimedia protocols, security protocols, dynamic power management schemes,
biological systems and many others. The website includes a case study repository, documentation (FAQ,
manual, tutorials, lectures), research papers and a discussion/help group.
MRMC [83] is a probabilistic model checker with a particular focus on systems modelled as discrete-time and
continuous-time Markov chains, augmented with reward information. It supports verification of a variety of
different probabilistic temporal logics. MRMC is freely available and the website provides a manual, research
papers and information on related tools.
Modest Toolset [87] supports the modelling and analysis of hybrid, real-time, distributed and stochastic systems.
The toolset is freely available and provides a modular framework centered around the stochastic hybrid
automata formalism [51]. It provides a variety of input languages and backend tools, including: mcpta, which
connects to PRISM for probabilistic real-time model checking; mctau, which connects to UPPAAL for real-time
model checking; modes, which performs simulation-based analysis; mosta, a visualisation tool; and ProHVer,
which connects to PHAVer for analysis of probabilistic hybrid systems. The website provides documentation on
the language, research papers and a small number of case studies.
Further Related Tools
CADP [23] is the “Construction and Analysis of Distributed Processes” toolset, for the design of asynchronous
concurrent systems, such as communication protocols, distributed systems, asynchronous circuits,
multiprocessor architectures and web services. The primary focus is on nonquantitative verification, but support
for some probabilistic models is also included. The toolset contains more than 42 tools and 17 software
components and is is free for academic use. The website includes links to manuals, tutorials, many case
studies, research papers and user forums.
Mo¨bius [86] is a multi-formalism modelling and analysis toolset for stochastic systems. Although originally
developed for the study of reliability, availability and performance of computer and network systems, it is now
used for a broad range of discrete-event systems, from biochemical reactions networks to the effects of
malicious attackers on secure computer systems. The tool is free for academic use and the website provides
links to a manual and academic papers.
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Appendix 2: Active Research Groups
Below, we give details of some of the research groups actively working in topics related to quantitative verification,
both in the UK and internationally. The list is not intended to be exhaustive and we apologise in advance to anyone
we have omitted.
In the UK
• Universities of Birmingham, Oxford and Glasgow: The PRISM tool [95] has been developed by groups
based at these three sites. More generally, the research carried out includes theory and practice, involving the
development of formalisms, theories, algorithms and tools, and their application to real-world case studies.
Oxford also has a large Automated Verification group [29], incorporating a Quantitative Analysis and
Verification group [96], working on a variety of areas including the verification of real-time, probabilistic, hybrid
and infinite-state systems.
• University of Edinburgh: PEPA group [93], part of the Laboratory for Foundations of Computer Science [74].
These groups have expertise in topics such as process algebraic techniques, continuous-time models and
verification of infinite-state probabilistic systems.
• Imperial College London: Analysis, Engineering, Simulation and Optimization of Performance (AESOP) group
[3]. The main areas of interest are analytic and simulated solutions to real performance problems.
• University of Newcastle: Dependability group [30]. This group investigates fundamental concepts,
development techniques, models, architectures and mechanisms that directly contribute to creating modern
information systems, networks and infrastructures that are dependable and secure in all aspects.
Internationally
• RWTH University of Aachen: Software Modeling and Verification (MOVES) group [102]. Focuses on the
modelling and verification of trustworthiness aspects (such as safety, reliability, performance and survivability) of
software systems by applying mathematical theories and methods.
• Aalborg University: Distributed and Embedded Systems (DES) group [35]. This group is concerned with the
modelling, analysis and realization of computer programs, with an emphasis on distributed and embedded
systems.
• ENS Cachan: Laboratoire Spe´cification et Ve´rification (LSV) [73]. Research focuses on the verification of
computerised systems, of databases and of security protocols, developing the mathematical and algorithmic
foundations for tools to automatically prove correctness and detect flaws.
• Carnegie Mellon University: Formal Methods [44]. Research covers various aspects of formal methods with a
particular focus on model checking, including verification of hybrid systems and statistical model checking.
• Universidad de Co´rdoba: Dependable Systems group [32]. Focuses on techniques of dependability (safety,
reliability, availability, security) of computer systems through formally based specification and analysis
techniques.
• Technische Universita¨t Dresden: Algebraic and Logical Foundations of Computer Science group [105].
Research is focused on analysis and model-checking algorithms for quantitative systems, temporal and modal
logics, automata-based approaches, game theory and infinite-state systems.
• INRIA: Preuves et Ve´rification group [57]. Incorporates several research teams working on a variety of topics
within quantitative verification, including probabilistic and real-time systems.
• IST Austria: Henzinger [54] and Chatterjee [61] groups. Research covers the design and analysis of concurrent
and embedded systems, verification and game theory, including a focus on quantitative aspects of these topics.
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• Masaryk University: Institute for Theoretical Computer Science [58]. Research focuses on stochastic systems,
probabilistic temporal logics and game theory.
• Technische Universita¨t Mu¨nchen: Foundations of Software Reliability and Theoretical Computer Science
group [106]. The group is interested in all aspects of software reliability, with special emphasis on model
checking and program analysis techniques.
• University of New South Wales and Macquarie University: Specification and Development of Probabilistic
Systems [103]. The group is concerned with formal specification and refinement of probabilistic systems and
recent work has focused on information security and anonymity.
• University of Oldenburg: Hybrid Systems group [56]. The group’s focus is on algorithms and tools for the
verification of hybrid systems.
• University of Pennsylvania: Penn Research in Embedded Computing and Integrated Systems Engineering
(PRECISE) centre [94]. This centre focuses on developing new modelling formalisms for analysing reliability of
computer-based systems; algorithms and tools for efficient analysis of these formalisms; and real-world case
studies drawn from a range of applications.
• University of Saarland: Dependable Systems and Software [31] and Reactive Systems [98] groups. Research
focuses on the design-time assurance of performance and dependability for reactive, embedded, distributed and
mobile systems and computer-aided methods for the synthesis and verification of reactive systems.
• University of Torino: [34] Performance Evaluation and System Validation group. The group’s research
concerns the development of tools and techniques for performance evaluation and system validation with focus
on techniques for modelling, performance evaluation and probabilistic verification.
• University of Twente: Design and Analysis of Communication Systems (DACS) group [33]. This group’s
mission is to contribute to the design and implementation of dependable networked systems, as well as
methods and techniques to support the design and dimensioning of such systems, such that they are
dependable, in all phases of their lifecycle.
In addition, the Formal Methods and Tools (FMT) group [42] is concerned with the development of formal
theories of concurrency, design methodologies for distributed systems and correctness assessment using
verification and validation techniques.
• Uppsala University: Embedded Systems group [37]. Aims towards scalable and precise techniques for timing
analysis and correctness verification of embedded systems.
• VERIMAG: Timed and Hybrid Systems group [109]. This group is interested in all aspects of system design,
ranging from theoretical foundations, via design techniques, down to implementation. In terms of models, the
group has a particular focus on timed and hybrid systems.
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